Abstract-Existing penetration testing approaches assess the vulnerability of a system by determining whether certain attack paths are possible in practice. Thus, penetration testing has so far been used as a qualitative research method. To enable quantitative approaches to security risk management, including decision support based on the cost-effectiveness of countermeasures, one needs quantitative measures of the feasibility of an attack. Also, when physical or social attack steps are involved, the binary view on whether a vulnerability is present or not is insufficient, and one needs some viability metric. When penetration tests are performed anyway, it is very easy for the testers to keep track of, for example, the time they spend on each attack step. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept of quantitative penetration testing to determine the diffiCUlty rather than the possibility of attacks based on such measurements. We do this by step-wise updates of expected time and probability of success for all steps in an attack scenario. In addition, we show how the skill of the testers can be included to improve the accuracy of the metrics, based on the framework of item response theory (Elo ratings). We prove the feasibility of the approach by means of simulations, and discuss application possibilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Penetration testing is a method in which testers system atically try to reach a certain target asset in an organisation by discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities, in order to determine whether real attacks would be possible. Such vulnerabilities may exist in the IT architecture, but also in physical access controls or lack of awareness of employees, enabling social engineering attacks. The results of a penetra tion test enable an organisation to address identified attack opportunities by the implementation of countermeasures. This approach is particularly effective when automated tools can be employed to find standard vulnerabilities in remotely accessible machines.
However, the "patch everything" approach to information or cyber security has been controversial for a long time, es pecially when multi-step, targeted attacks are concerned. In such attacks, remote access may be combined with physical and even social attack steps, and a determined attacker often has a reasonable chance of getting in. Economic concerns 978-1-4799-2990-0/1 3/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE 49
demand that countermeasures are cost-effective, and with a limited budget, risks need to be prioritised [1] . The mere existence of an attack possibility is not sufficient to provide decision support for countermeasure investment. In order to support decisions, quantitative metrics for security and security risks are needed [2] . Such metrics are not always easy to obtain, as data on attacks is often not available. Penetration testing, however, may constitute the ideal setting to provide the necessary data. Existing penetration testing approaches assess the vulner ability of a system by determining whether certain attack paths are possible in practice. Therefore, penetration testing has thus far been used as a qualitative research method. But when complex, multi-domain penetration tests involving human testers are performed anyway, it is very easy for the testers to keep track of, for example, the time they spend on each attack step. Such measurements could be used as a basis for quantitative judgements on security. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept of quantitative penetration testing, and a method to determine the difficulty rather than the possibility of attacks from penetration testing results. Our method is based on the social science framework of item response theory, in particular Elo ratings, applied to both attack steps and the testers executing those.
In section II, we discuss the state-of-the-art and related approaches. In section III, we define the requirements for quantitative penetration testing. We formalise our basic method for quantitative penetration testing in section IV, and use item response theory to include attacker skill in section V. The results of simulations are shown in section VI. We end with application opportunities in section VII and conclusions in section VIII. Due to space constraints, we refer to [3] for more technical details.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Penetration Testing
Penetration testing started as a hackers' art, involving long sessions to attempt to break into an organisation via the Internet. Many attempts have been made to move towards more scientific methods (see e.g. [4] ), and several automated tools for online penetration testing are now available.
Next to online methods, penetration testing may also in clude physical access to the facilities of an organisation [5] . In addition, social engineering can be included to determine the human weaknesses that may provide access to assets [6] , [7] , [S], [9] , [10] . Overviews of penetration testing methods are provided in [11] , [12] , [13] .
Penetration testing may focus on single vulnerabilities, or may involve multi-step attacks that would lead to the assets [14] . With multi-step attacks, attack trees [15] , [16] or attack nets [4] can be used as a basis for the tests.
B. Item Response Theory
Item response theory is a classical method to calibrate tests, such as intelligence tests, when the skill levels of the persons taking part in the calibration is unknown. From a set of correct and incorrect responses of a set of persons to a set of items, both the skill of the persons and the difficulty of the items are estimated. The simplest case are I-parameter or Rasch models [17] . In the Math Garden project, this idea was combined with dynamic updates of the ratings, rather than a separate calibration phase [IS] . This system is similar to the one used to rank chess players in [19] .
In [20] , it was proposed to apply the framework of item response theory to security metrics. The key idea is that the likelihood of success can be estimated from attack strength and defence strength (difficulty). In this paper, rather than considering single-event attacks, we focus on multi-step attacks, in which digital, physical, and social attack vectors can be combined. Also, the proposal in [20] did not include time as a separate variable, and this is an important contribution of the present paper. We separate probability of success (related to attacker skill and step difficulty) and time or effort spent (related to attacker speed and the labour intensity of the step) into different variables. Different possibilities for including response time (RT) in item response theory models are discussed in [21] .
III. REQUIREMENTS
A. Parameters
To enable quantitative penetration testing, at first one has to choose the quantitative variables to be taken into account. We consider the time that an attacker requires to perform an attack, and the probability that the attack is successful. Depending on the problem context, time can be replaced by other parameters, such as resources to answer the question 'How much money does an attacker have to invest? ' We consider multi-step attacks and, thus, we assume that complex attacks are composed of elementary steps. This assumption is widely used in attack modelling formalisms such as attack trees or attack nets [15] , [16] , [4] . In an actual attack, the steps are executed sequentially.
B. Distributions
We consider a random variable X that describes the time of a successful attack step execution. We are interested in the cumulative distribution function (CDF) that represents the probability that the attack step is executed successfully within t time units, that is the function f(t) = JP'[X :s; t] of X. We need to make an assumption for the underlying family of distributions and then estimate the corresponding parameters.
Experiments on the intrusion into computer systems showed that the intrusion process consists of different phases with an exponentially distributed execution time [22] . Es pecially in the context of complex analysis the exponential distribution has its merits: its shape is completely defined by one parameter, it is tractable and can easily be embedded in complex calculations. Let X be an exponentially distributed random variable, then its CDF is given by JP'(X:S; t) = 1-e-).. t, for any t E JR + .
Its expected value is given by JE[X] = t.
C. Attack Steps and Attacks
Formally, an attack step a is an elementary, non-refinable step in the course of an attack. The attacker needs to invest an exponentially distributed amount of time with parameter Aa E JR + to successfully execute the attack step. The probability that the attacker succeeds in the execution of the step is denoted by Pa E [0,1]. An attack scenario A is then defined as a sequence of attack steps A = al," " an. An example attack scenario is a 'laptop theft', composed of the steps 'get access to room', 'cut lock' and 'escape'. The attacker has to succeed in all three steps to finish the attack successfully. The model of this attack is presented in Fig. 1 .
The execution of each attack step i takes an exponentially distributed time with parameter Ai. The attacker either fails with probability 1 -Pi or succeeds with probability Pi, and if he fails in one attack step, the whole attack is aborted, indicated by the black absorbing states. If the attacker succeeds in the execution of i, he immediately starts with the execution of attack step i + 1. The attack is successful, if all 3 attack steps are penetrated. get access cut lock escape Figure 1 . The attack scenario 'laptop theft' composed of 3 attack steps, each defined by parameter Ai and probability of success Pi. i = 1,2,3.
States in which the attack fails are coloured in black. The state in which the attacker has reached his goal is coloured in grey.
In the following, we want to use the observations of pen etration tests as effective as possible to quantify individual attack steps with respect to the parameters Pa and Aa.
IV. BASIC PARAMETER ESTIMATION
A. Static Estimation
The most intuitive approach to derive estimates Aa and Pa for an attack step a is the computation of the mean average over a series of observations. Given a set of observations of attack scenarios in which an attack step a occurs k times, we estimate ta with observed execution times t 1 , ... , t k by
and use the fact that 1/ Aa is the expected value of the exponential distribution to derive Aa = l/ta. The probability of success Pa is estimated analogously. The advantage of these estimates is that they are consistent, i.e. on average we hit the true value, and unbiased, i.e. for k --+ 00 we hit the true value with arbitrary precision. Moreover, the standard error of the average mean, governed by Jrc with a the standard deviation of one single observation, vanishes with increasing k. However, we will argue below that time and probability depend on two parameters each, which have to be updated simultaneously. This framework requires that estimates are updated in a stepwise fashion.
B. Dynamic Estimation
Starting with initial estimates Aa and Pa, we iteratively update these value with one observation at a time. The general idea is to obtain an observation-based estimate and then update the initial value by performing a linear interpolation. For instance, if we observe execution time t, we have t as the observation-based estimate for Aa. We use this value to update the initial estimate with
The strength of an update is determined by factor C A a E [0, 1].
It turns out that if we update this value according to
prior to each updating step, then each update has equal impact upon the final estimate Aa. Additionally, if we set C A a = 0 for the first update, i.e. our initial estimate has zero weight, we compute the mean average.
V. ITEM RESPONSE THEORY MODEL
The more skilled and resourceful the attacker is, the more likely he will succeed in the execution of even difficult steps. It is therefore better to consider the properties of both defender and attacker in the estimations of attack step parameters. In this section, we propose a model for estimating properties of attack step for attacks in which the identity of the attacker is known. This is typically the case in a penetration testing setting. As both attacker skill and step difficulty are assessed, this model is very similar to what is called item response theory in social science.
The standard assumption in item response theory is that if the ratings of both "competing" actors are equal, then the probability of success is 0.5. For example, the probability of a person with skill 500 solving a problem with difficulty 500 is 0.5. A logistic distribution is typically used to relate the rating difference of the actors to the probability of success. We use a dynamic version of item response theory here, in which ratings are updated after each event. This is how the Elo rating for chess players works [19] , as well as the adaptive math exercises in Math Garden [18] . Details can be found in [20] .
In the original Elo framework, there is only one value to be updated. Here, like in [21] , we take both probability of success and execution time into account. As we distin guish between the output parameters execution time and probability of success, we also define two parameters for each attacker, or rather attacker profile, and attack step to represent the individual impact on these two outputs. The attacker's influence upon the probability of success is called skill, and his speed impacts the execution time of an attack step. From the perspective of the attack step, the probability of success is determined by its difficulty and the execution time by its labour intensity. These parameters form the basis of our analysis framework depicted in Figure 2 . In the following, these parameters will be expressed by Elo ratings.
Outcome / Result
Attacker parameters Execution time In order to use the time parameter in combination with ratings, we need a definition that allows us to relate the speed and labour intensity ratings, just like the skill and difficulty ratings are related by the assumption that equality of the 20J 39th International Conference on Information Assurance and Security (lAS) ratings gives 0.5 probability of success. Here, we assume that in case the ratings are equal, the expected duration is 1 time unit, or A = 1. The dependencies of these parameters with respect to the formation of values for outcome and execution time are defined as follows.
A. Distribution of Execution Time
For an attack A with attacker j we denote with Tj the speed of the attacker and with Bi the labour intensity of attack step i. The relation between these two parameters is defined as in RT models [21] : the execution time tij of attack step i for attacker j can be derived by
Speed is thus defined by decomposing the execution time into two parameters, one for the speed of the attacker and one for the labour intensity of the attack step. We now want to obtain a distribution function for the execution time with respect to these two parameters. Remember that we assume the execution time of attacker j for attack step i to be exponentially distributed with parameter Aij and expected value ,L. We thus assume ,L = ti J " = Ib. and derive the 
B. Probability for Attack
Step Outcome
Similarly to above, we define {3j as the skill level of attacker j and Oi as the difficulty of attack step i. The probability of the attacker succeeding in the attack step depends jointly on his skill and the difficulty of the attack step. We describe this probability by a logistic model (IPL or Rasch model, [17] ), which expresses the probability to successfully execute attack step i (denoted as ri In the following, we present formulas to systematically update the Elo ratings for B, T, 0 and (3 on the basis of one single observation. In a penetration testing setting, one can ask the testers to monitor the time they spent on the different attack steps precisely. Moreover, one knows the identity of the attackers, and can therefore maintain Elo ratings for each of them, based on past performance.
Assume we have observed an attack scenario A contain ing attack steps al,'" ,an and have identified attacker j. Furthermore, we know the execution time and outcome of each involved attack step. With this data we want to update our ratings in a stepwise fashion. If no initial ratings exist, one can ask experts to assign a reasonable first rating which is then successively updated with real data. The updates of the ratings in our framework are based on equation (2) . The idea is to derive an expected value on the basis of previous ratings, and update this forecast with data from an attack observation. The larger the deviation between expectation and observation, the stronger the update of the initial rating in favour of the observed data.
Updates of labour intensity Bi and attacker speed Tj." Assume we observed execution time tij for an attack step i, and we want to update our ratings accordingly. With equation (4) we obtain Tjtij as the observation-based rating for Bi. We then update Bi by linear interpolation of the initial and the observation-based rating, formally
The factor co , is derived by iterative application of (3) so that each update is weighted equally. The rating Tj is updated analogously:
Note that the updates of these two ratings depend on each other, and thus, they should be performed one after another instead of in parallel.
Updates of difficulty 0i and attacker skill {3j." Assume we observed outcome r i E {O, I} of attack step i, where ri = 0 indicates the attacker's failure and ri = 1 his success. Since the observation is a boolean value, we cannot transform it into a rating as above (ri = 1 would mean that the rating is infinitely large). Instead, we compute the expected probability of success p with equation (6), i.e. p = l fJ"' and deduct the observed outcome. This l+ e ' :J approach is the same as in the classical Elo model. We then use the same update routine as above, i.e.
(9)
The rating {3j is updated analogously with p and ri inverted, since a successful execution should increase the attacker rating:
VI. SIMULATION We implemented the framework in a simulation program as a proof-of-concept. Each simulation run consists of a test set that contains k observations of attacks. Each attack is randomly synthesized from a pool of attack steps. Further, each attack step in this pool has a true value B;rue for its labour intensity and a true value o;rue for its difficulty.
We want to investigate, how fast the quality of the rating Bi improves with a growing number of observations, and execute several simulation runs with varying k. In each simulation run, we randomly generate k attacks, the execution times of all involved attack steps are generated randomly according to (5) . The attacker speed Tj is randomly generated for each observation.
Initially we set cO i = 0, so we assume there is no initial estimate, and use all k observations to perform stepwise updates on e i. To measure the accuracy of the result, we computed the sample variance in percentage of the true value for N = 5000 simulation runs, i.e. N 2 1 "' (e j etrue ) 2
We conducted similar experiments for the attack step difficulty Oi in which the outcome of each attack step is randomly generated with (6) . The results are shown in Figure 3 .
The stepwise update algorithms iteratively improve the quality of the estimates, especially significantly for the labour intensity. Quite accurate results can be achieved with about 25 updates.
VII. ApPLICATION
The framework outlined above paves the way towards obtaining quantitative results from penetration tests. The practial applicability depends to a large extent on the goal of the measurements. If one wants to obtain statistically significant results, one would need to set up a large-scale experiment with many penetration testers. Testers need to try the same attacks in order to be able to update their ratings. This can be done for research purposes, and it has been shown for qualitative penetration testing using social engineering [7] . Based on the ideas developed in this paper, we are planning similar experiments to obtain quantitative data. However, such experiments would most likely be unrealistic in a corporate risk management setting.
Still, as our results show, one can obtain reasonable esti mates with only a few attempts and a few penetration testers. A reasonable strategy for practical testing could be to let 2 or 3 penetration testers execute the same scenarios, monitor the variance of the outcomes, and hire more penetration testers only if the variance is high.
Quantitative penetration testing has the advantage that improvements in security can also be quantified. If the test is repeated after improvements have been made, the newly measured difficulty of attack steps can be compared against the previous value. With item response theory, this is possible even if different penetration testers are involved, assuming the ratings of the testers are sufficiently accurate.
Apart from yielding quantitative results, our proposal has another advantage: ratings may motivate penetration testers to perform well. Our hypothesis is that penetration testers would be keen on obtaining high ratings, and therefore would be incentivised to do a good job. To test this hypoth esis, one would need to run two parallel penetration tests, one with and one without the rating incentive, and evaluate differences in the time needed to succeed. Obviously, ratings could also be an incentive to cheat in reporting results, for example by reporting a shorter time than actually needed, or sharing ideas with other penetration testers, in order to increase one's rating. If this turns out to be a real problem, reporting would have to be done by an independent actor. On the other hand, security officers might be tempted to simplify attack steps hoping to increase their budget.
Finally, if there is not enough data to support difficulty ratings for steps, one can also rate organisations instead of attack steps. For each attack observation, the ratings of the attacker/tester and the rating of the organisation would then be updated. In this case, one would not obtain quantitative results of steps, but one would still have the advantage of being able to say how likely it would be that an attacker with a low rating would succeed in attacking the organisation.
The main application of quantitative penetration testing is foreseen in quantitative security risk management, requiring quantitative security metrics. Based on the Risk Ta xonomy of The Open Group [23] , which we use in our project, quantitative penetration testing provides a metric for the vul nerability of the organisation to attacks. However, in order to fully estimate risk, metrics for the expected frequency of attacks and the impact of attacks are needed as well. These are not trivial, and especially a suitable model of the (real) attackers is required to estimate their behaviour in response to the perceived gain, effort (time), and probability of success. We address such questions in other papers. Here, the claim is that our new proposal for quantitative penetration testing provides an important step towards fully quantitative security risk management, and in particular decision support for investment in countermeasures.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented a framework for quantita tive penetration testing, which is the first such framework as far as we are aware of. The approach features the registration of the time taken in testing, and the calculation of the difficulty of attack steps based on the time and the skill of the tester. The skill of the tester is also updated based on the performance in the tests.
The approach can as well be used with real attack data, but in a more limited sense, since the identity of the attacker is unknown, and the time for the individual steps may not be available either.
The main limitation of the approach lies in the amount of data required to obtain statistically significant results.
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However, as we have discussed, in many practical settings it may be sufficient to gain reasonable confidence in the estimates by repeating the test scenarios a few times, and monitoring the variance in the outcomes. In any case, the simple addition of time metrics to penetration testing already improves upon the existing situation in terms of the information provided for security risk management purposes.
One possible extension would be separating the time spent by the attacker, and the total time elapsed before success. This would for example be relevant in a phishing attack, in which the time spent per attempt is negligible, but the time until success may be much longer. Another extension involves multiple skill ratings for the testers, for example separating their hacking, physical access, and social engineering skills. The rating to be updated is then dependent on the nature of the attack step.
In the future, we plan to use this approach for gather ing data on the difficulty of attack steps, including social engineering, to be used in the case studies in our current project. We expect the case studies to provide insights for further extensions of the framework.
